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PROFILE OF A TERRORIST: DISTINGUISHING 
FREEDOM FIGHTERS FROM TERRORISTS 
L.F.E. Goldie 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart, the center cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
W. B. Yeats, The Second Coming 
I. INTRODUCTION 
News items, editorial statements and learned writings are in-
creasingly testifying to the internationalization of terrorism.1 One 
recent example will suffice to illustrate this commonly understood 
and accepted phenomenon. Recently, French authorities inter-
cepted a ship carrying arms, ammunition and explosives from 
Libya to Northern Ireland2 and the massacre of Lod Airport was 
carried out by Japanese terrorists as the surrogates of the Palestin-
ian Liberation Organization. 8 As the terrorist becomes increasingly 
internationalized, he becomes more the enemy of all mankind than 
at any previous time. In this process, states are seeking ever-
widening bases for exercising their jurisdiction in their pursuit of 
security and the implementation of punishment for indiscriminate 
killing and injury. This paper will review and advocate develop-
ments in this search for a universal or near-universal jurisdiction 
against a crime which once was seen as consecrated to patriotism 
but which is now seen as an inhuman, anarchistic act having, possi-
bly, its own twisted validity for its perpetrator but, in truth, being 
perpetrated against all mankind. 
A. A STIPULATED DEFINITION 
A cliche often met in discussions of the unlawfulness or de-
pravity of terroristic activities is the limp-wristed response that 
1. HYDRA OF CARNAGE (U. Ra'anan, R. Pfaltzgraff, R. Shultz, E. Halperin & I. Lukes ed. 
1986). 
2. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1987, at AlO, col. 6. 
3. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1987, at AlO, col. 6. 
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"one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." A contrast-
ing expression of skepticism is that of the late Professor and J us-
tice on the International Court of Justice, Richard Baxter, when he 
wisely pointed out that only too often accusations of terrorism, in 
cases where crimes and especially crimes of violence or war have 
been committed, confuse the issue.• He stigmatized the wholesale 
resort to the term "terrorism" in contemporary rhetoric as being 
"imprecise; ... ambiguous; in and above all [serving] no operative 
legal purpose. "6 Among his conclusions were the following 
propositions: 
1. Banditry is still banditry, and war crimes are still war crimes. 
2. It is well either to keep away from distinguishing criminals act-
ing for political motives from other, common criminals. Actually, 
hijacking has been brought under some degree of control, not by 
treaties, nor by international law, but by the presence of armed 
guards. 
5. Above all, we should not allow talk about wars of national libera-
tion and the events in the Middle East to distort our vision. Indis-
criminate violence, whether by way of war crimes, attacks on diplo-
mats, seizure of aircraft, or the killing of civilians in third states, is 
and remains unlawful. There is perhaps more to be feared in bad 
law on this subject than there is to be hoped for in good law.8 
Each of Professor Baxter's conclusions is completely persuasive. 
Yet we are left with the feeling that despite all the great heat and 
very little light (which Professor Baxter pointed out) that the term 
"terrorism" seems to generate, it may possess a residue of specific 
and useful meaning. Some have agreed that a common crime or a 
war crime committed in the context of "terrorism" may be viewed 
as having an added element of depravity when committed as a ter-
roristic act. Others, alternatively, have held that what would other-
wise be a criminal act, may become justified by labeling the act 
with the appellation "political," or by attributing it to the facilita-
tion of public ends. 7 
In this latter context, the term terrorism thus becomes a bene-
diction and an exculpation. But it is a benison for the man of 
4. See Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380 
(1974). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 384-85. 
7. For example, in extradition proceedings, where such a characterization excludes the 
perpetrator from rendition in order to undergo the possibility of politically motivated repri-
sals administered in the guise of a trial. 
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blood, for it acts to reinforce his philosophical convictions. If the 
notion of "public ends" has this important emotional function in 
the context of extradition, it may not be surprising that publicists 
who are sympathetic towards "mixed offenses" perpetrated for po-
litical ends on land should also exonerate from the universal juris-
diction attached to piracy, jure gentium8 violations of personal in-
tegrity and property rights on the high seas if perpetrated for 
"public ends." Two contexts, rhetoric and law, may (and fre-
quently do) come together in cases where private and public ends 
are contrasted and where conduct justified by reference to the lat-
ter qualifying term is exonerated thereby. 
A recent study in The Economist9 agrees that "violent resis-
tance to authority is often justified: not a few of today's presidents 
and prime ministers were yesterday's guerrillas,mo but it also 
makes the point that the distinction between freedom fighters and 
terrorists is to be found in the targets struck. 11 Bona fide guerrillas 
strike at military targets and, although non-combatants may be, 
and frequently are, killed, that is because they are near or in the 
military target. The crucial difference being that "harming [the 
victims] is not the normal purpose of the operation. "12 Terrorists, 
by contrast, intend to harm non-combatants: attacks on them pro-
vide the means whereby the terrorists exert their will upon third 
persons, upon the general population and upon governments.13 
The article in the The Economist stresses further this refer-
ence to targets in stating that the "essential feature of modern ter-
rorism is the severing of the link between the target of violence 
and the reason for violence. "14 A chilling illustration of this harsh 
point is the senseless killing of a "wheelchair-bound American on 
board an Italian cruise ship" to get back at Israel.16 In these cases, 
8. Translated as "by the law of nations." 
9. How To Tell A Terrorist, 300 THE ECONOMIST 9 (July 26, 1986) [hereinafter Terror-
ist]. While this article may express a common viewpoint, it is the clearest articulation yet 
seen by this writer, of the importance of the distinction. Its lucid analysis renders the hypo-
critical confusion between terrorists and freedom fighters all the harder to sustain. See also 
J. HELMS, ADDITIONAL VIEWS, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON 
THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, S. REP. No.703, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 12-13 (1985) (quoting President Reagan, Secretary of State Schultz and Attorney Gen-
eral Meese). 
10. Terrorist, supra note 8, at 9. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 10. 
15. Id. 
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indiscriminate terrorism is heedless of the fact that the victims of, 
and the reasons for, the violence are complete strangers. The vic-
tims, in fact, are killed, are randomly taken as hostages, or are re-
duced to depersonalized objects, essentially pawns and symbols, 
for the separate and impersonal purpose of instilling fear into the 
hearts of a target population and obtaining leverage over a target 
government. Such haphazardly taken victims have thereby been 
deprived of any personal validity, whereas, if the victim is also the 
reason for or object of the violence, his humanity is affirmed by the 
bloody deed perpetrated against him. 
With these clarifications in mind, it is believed that (with 
some suggested additions) the statutory definition given in the 
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act16 most closely 
tracks the thoughts in the preceding paragraphs as well as those 
that follow. That statute (plus an amending paragraph in brackets 
proposed in this article to identify the haphazard and random 
character of terrorism more clearly) defines international terrorism 
as an activity that: 
1. [I]nvolve[s] violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are 
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States (or of any 
state or that would be a criminal violation if committed within 
the jurisdiction of the United States or any state); 
[la. Are carried out against persons who: 
A. have no personal connection with, or are only adven-
titiously connected with, the objects of the perpetra-
tor(s); or 
B. Are indiscriminately selected as victims of criminal 
act(s); or 
C. Carry some subjective, symbolic significance for the 
perpetrator(s).17] 
16. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §1801(c) (1982). 
17. Carlos Marighella himself identified this symbolism and the adventitious character 
of the victims of terrorism when he wrote: 
Attacking wholeheartedly this election farce and the so-called "political solution" so 
appealing to the opportunists, the urban guerilla must become more aggressive and 
violent, resorting without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations [a euphemism 
for armed robbery, burglary and theft], assaults, kidnappings, executions [a euphe-
mism for murder], etc. 
MARIGHELLA, MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA 21 (1969) (translation into English held 
on file in author's library). 
Finally, an illustration of the adventitious, impersonal and symbolic nature of the ter-
roristic act is to be found in a Letter to the Editor of the Syracuse Herald-Journal. The 
author wrote: 
In response to authorities being baffied by the recent increase of brutal rapes, I 
would suggest that what we are viewing is the oldest and most vile form of terrorism 
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2. [A]ppear[s] to be intended: 
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(B) to influence the policy of the government by intimida-
tion or coercion; or 
(C) to effect the conduct of a government by assassination 
or kidnapping; and 
3. [O]ccur[s] totally outside the United States or transcend[s] na-
tional boundaries in terms of the means by which they are ac-
complished, the person they appear intended to coerce or intimi-
date, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum.18 
By conducting himself in a manner which shows that his 
targets are always "targets of opportunity" in the widest connota-
tion of that unfortunate term, and are separate (except perhaps by 
mere fortune) from his object, the terrorist places everyone at po-
tential risk. Hence, since everyone is potentially and without rea-
son his victim, his conduct should be stigmatized as that of one 
who is hostis humani generis,19 no less than pirates, slave traders 
and the perpetrators of crimes falling within the Nuremberg 
Principles. 20 
II. ASSERTIONS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
TERRORIST ACTS 
A. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
Should a terrorist act be perpetrated in the United States, the 
on the rise. The victims are the innocent, the anger is generalized - directed only at 
expression - and there is no guessing who, or what, or where, or when, or how, or 
(most puzzling) why? 
In my view, the inhumanity to humankind that we witness between Catholics 
and Protestants, Israelis and Palestinians, and blacks and whites on the interna-
tional scene is an expression of feelings of disempowerment. 
As we see women as a group rising out of the position of non-choice and becom-
ing economically and politically viable and competitive and empowered, I would 
predict that we will see a frightening increase in the cruelest and most humanly 
violating form of terrorism - rape. 
Syracuse Herald-Journal, Oct. 4, 1986, at A5, col. 3. 
18. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982). 
19. Loosely translated, this term is taken to mean one who commits hostilities upon 
the subjects and property of any or all nations without regard to right or duty or any pre-
tense of public authority. 
20. The Nuremburg Principles are implicit in the Charter and Judgments of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Major War Criminals, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 
(Supp. 1945); see also 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 (1947). 
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state on whose soil the act was perpetrated, or the United States, 
would have criminal jurisdiction over the offense on the traditional 
basis of the "subjective territoriality" theory.21 Jurisdiction is also 
recognized under the objective territoriality principle where an of-
fense may have been perpetrated abroad but is consummated in 
the territory of the sovereign claiming jurisdiction. 22 Again, states 
recognize other states' claims to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
their own citizens' offenses against its laws when these are commit-
ted outside the territories of those states asserting jurisdiction on 
the basis of nationality. The reciprocal basis of jurisdiction, namely 
the "passive personality" principle,28 ·has long been a matter of de-
bate, but, increasingly, states that have resisted this basis for crim-
inal jurisdiction in the past, are now coming to embrace it as a 
matter of felt necessity.u Aside from nationality and territoriality, 
states also assert, and the Family of Nations generally recognizes, a 
claim, under the "protective principle,"H of jurisdiction over 
crimes against the "security, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of that state. "26 Finally there is, of course, the "univer-
sality principle"27 which, because of the latitude permitted to 
states under this rubric, is limited to only a few instances. Those 
instances, moreover, engage the conscience of mankind and involve 
piracy, the slave trade and crimes under the Nuremberg 
21. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction as to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 480, 484 
(1935) [hereinafter Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime]. 
22. Id. at 487. 
23. See, e.g., The Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 65 (Moore, J., concurring); 2 J. 
MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228, 231-32 (1906); Moore, Report on Extraterritorial 
Crime and the Cutting Case, 9 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 761 (1887). 
24. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 113A, 233l(e) (Supp. 1986). Congress passed these sections 
in 1986 amending the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1984. See S. 
4418, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 4418 (1986) (statement of Senator Arlen Spector 
introducing §1429). This bill was adopted unanimously by a 92-0 vote, and eventually be-
came law under the name of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 
1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4801 et seq. (1986). 
25. The "protective principle" is defined as the recognition in international law that 
each state may exercise jurisdiction over crimes against its security or it's vital economic 
interests. J . CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 633 (3rd ed. 1976). 
26. Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 20, art. 7, at 543; see also United 
States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968). In Pizzarusso it was held that the United 
States did have jurisdiction to convict an alien for the crime of knowingly making a false 
statement under oath on a visa application taken by an American consular official in a for-
eign country. 
27. The "universality principle" states that all states are entitled to arrest pirates on 
the high seas and to punish them irrespective of their nationality and the place of commis-
sion of the crime. J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (3rd ed. 1976). 
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Principles. 28 
While terrorists, in the sense of being indiscriminate killers 
whose random acts of violence put everyone potentially at risk, 
may well invite the stigma of being, like pirates, the enemies of 
mankind, that comprehensive characterization of terrorism has not 
yet come about. On the other hand, domestic legislation, such as 
the recent amendments to the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Anti-Terrorism Act (1986 Act),29 have greatly extended the enact-
ing states' criminal jurisdiction to include competence based on the 
"passive personality" principle. so Indeed, a combination of the 
1986 Act and the Ker-Frisbie rule81 give states adhering to the pas-
sive personality principle plus the doctrine of male captus bene 
detentum82 a very wide scope of criminal jurisdiction, but, of 
course, not as wide as the universal jurisdiction. 
B. JURISDICTION IN TORT 
Because U.S. legislation treats alien victims of foreign torts 
and tortfeasors differently from citizens who have been injured by 
foreign tortfeasors, these two categories will be treated separately. 
Following an analysis of these two distinct bases of tort claims, this 
section will discuss the impact of the Alien Torts Statute88 and the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197684 and possible reforms 
thereto on such tort claims. Also, the question will be raised as to 
the possibility of treaties giving rise to independent causes of ac-
tion in tort. 
28. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
29. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4801 et 
seq. (1986). 
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
31. That is, the rule that a person forcibly abducted and taken from one state to an-
other to be tried for a crime does not invalidate his conviction in a court of the latter state 
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
This rule was founded on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. 
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), which applied the 
old Roman Law doctrine of male captus bene detentum (translated as "a bad capture [but] 
a good detention"). That is, the wrongfulness of the capture does not vitiate the detention. 
This rule was upheld recently (subject to some qualifications, however) in United But 
see , at . Judges Oakes's dicta asserts a more restrictive (but unexceptionable) reading of 
the rule in his separate but concurring opinion in the case. This principle was also invoked 
in Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 l.L.R. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, 1961). 
32. This term is translated as "A bad capture [but] a good detention." 
33. 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (1982). 
34. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982). 
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1. The Alien Tort Statute - Aliens as Victims 
In 1789, the First Congress incorporated a provision into sec-
tion 9 of the Judiciary Act, a provision which has been named the 
Alien Tort Statute.3~ This provision, which has remained substan-
tially unchanged since the time of its enactment, prescribes that: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States.36 
In Filatiga v. Pena-lrala,37 Dolly Filatiga, living in Washing-
ton, brought a civil suit against Pena-Irala alleging that he had 
wrongfully caused her brother's death by torture. She sought 10 
million dollars as . compensatory and punitive damages. 38 At the 
time of Joelito Filatiga's torture and death, Pena-Irala was a 
Paraguayan police officer and a supporter of the Stroessner regime 
there.39 Dolly had been taken into Pena-Irala's home to view her 
brother's body which bore marks Of severe torture:'0 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York on the ground that the plaintiff's suit did 
implicate the law of nations, in that torture is contrary to custom-
ary internatiornd law and that, accordingly, the district court had 
jurisdiction under the Alien Torts Act and Dolly Filatiga had a 
cause of action thereunder:n Since Paraguayan law forbad the use 
of torture, the court stated that Pena-Irala had merely acted 
"under color of state law," but not validly as an officer of the state, 
and therefore was not protected under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act.•2 
In a later case before the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, this holding was distinguished on the ground of 
sovereign immunity, that is, the state action was merely "colora-
bly" state action. Thus, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,•3 
35. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1350 (1982). 
36. Id. 
37. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
38. ' Id. at 879. 
39. Id. at 878. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982). 
43. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs were survivors and representatives of per-
sons murdered in an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel in 1978. Id. at 775. The action 
was instituted for compensatory and punitive damages stemming from the attack naming 
Libya as the defendant. Id. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id.; see Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 
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Judge Edwards pointed out that "jurisdiction over Libya is barred 
by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ... which preserves im-
munity .[of the sovereign state tortfeasor] for tort claims unless in-
jury or death occurs in the United States.""" 
2. Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act - Citizens 
as Victims 
Since the Tel-Oren decision, the American Bar Association 
and the Department of State have tentatively proposed, and the 
Congress is in the process of considering, various amendments to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act's restriction of U.S. courts' 
jurisdiction over non-commercial torts inflicted by states leading to 
death or injury in the United States. 
In the face of some commentators, especially since the Tel-
Oren decision, the Department of State takes the view that while 
the tort provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act should 
be amended so as not to limit the U.S. courts' jurisdiction over 
torts causing injury in this country, those amendments should not 
go so far as to eliminate the discretionary acts exclusion. •G An ar-
gument against eliminating the discretionary acts exclusion runs as 
follows: the Federal Tort Claims Act contains this exclusion as far 
as suits against the United States are concerned."6 It would, 
clearly, be most invidious if the United States were, in removing 
the present limits, also to remove a shield from foreign sovereign 
state defendants in tort cases in its courts, when it retains that 
same shield for itself. 
But would the presence of this defense immunize governments 
and officers who are pursuing policies of terrorism from answer-
ability in our courts? Engaging in an act of terrorism abroad is per 
se an internationally wrongful act, and such an act may not fall 
within the traditional defenses of sovereign immunity and act of 
1981). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 775. 
44. Id. at 775-76 n.1. But see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 
1980) (Letelier 1). Note the comment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in the Leteliers' suit following their default judgment in Letelier I, in which they 
sought to levy execution against the Chilean state-owned airline: "the Congress did in fact 
create a right without a remedy." Letelier v. The Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 798 (2d 
Cir. 1984). 
45. Verville, Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 86 DEPT. OF STATE BUL-
LETIN 73, at 76 (No. 2114, Sept. 1986). 
46. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 1605(a)(5)(A). An interesting example of 
where a court has upheld the distinction can be found in Chute v. U.S., 446 F. Supp. 61 (D. 
Mass. 1978). 
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state. Equally it would fall outside any defense based upon discre-
tionary acts, since there is no presumption that an official acting in 
the state's name has the discretion to engage in wrongdoing with 
impunity. Rather, such conduct should, under an extension of the 
precedent created in the extradition proceedings against the for-
mer dictator of Venezuela in Jimenez u. Aristeguieta;" be treated 
as the wrongful act of the individual purporting to act as the Head 
of State (or perhaps the Head of Government where the Head of 
State performs only ceremonial functions) under "color of state 
law."48 Hence, as with the states of the United States, especially in 
connection with civil rights cases,49 such conduct should be review-
able in an appropriate judicial forum. 10 
The Department of State's position of maintaining political 
branch control over tort claims arising out of terrorists' acts is re-
flected in the testimony of Ms. Elizabeth Verville, Acting Legal 
47. 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 
(1963) (the Act of State doctrine will not permit U.S. courts to pass upon the validity of 
foreign government actions performed in their capacity as sovereigns within their own 
territory). 
Filatiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), is a more recent decision to hold an 
individual officer responsible for an act performed in the name of the state (Paraguay) but 
illegal under international law (and the law of Paraguay), on the ground that the act was 
done "under color of state law" and hence within the reach of the Alien Torts Statute. See 
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
On the other hand, Jimenez may well be regarded as more closely relevant since it set 
aside the Act of State defense to a dictator's misuse of power and so permitted extradition 
back to Venezuela. Jimenez, 311 F.2d at 557-58. In the present hypothetical situation, juris-
diction should be asserted under the Alien Torts Statute against an individual, but the con-
duct might well be seen as falling within the Act of State protection for Heads of State (or 
of Government) were it not for the ruling in Jimenez. 
48. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) 
49. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) where the Court stated the principle as 
follows: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the 
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although 
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the 
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a politi-
cal question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack 
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from mutifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question. 
50. Id. at 217. 
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Adviser of the Department of State. •H Ms. Verville stated: 
In other kinds of tort cases, we may have an even greater need 
to maintain some political branch control of the actions taken in 
response to foreign state wrongdoing, even in our own territory. 
Where the act is criminal, we may elect to pursue the individual 
perpetrators for prosecution and demand their extradition from 
the offending state. Against the state itself, we can attempt to ob-
tain redress of . private injury through diplomatic pressures. How-
ever, the decision on sanctions against the economic interests of 
the state or seizure of state property in such cases, with its con-
comitant potential for retaliation and disruption of broader rela-
tions between the United States and that country, might not al-
ways be best left solely a matter of judicial response to private 
petition.H 
On the other hand, this thesis may limit the scope of the 
courts of this country considerably more than would be consistent 
with the argument that in a world following the horizontal rather 
than the vertical modelH for the vindication of rights, its percep-
tion of the pervasive need for the political branches to act on be-
half of residents here is, generally speaking, unexceptionable. But, 
what should be stressed is that the judiciary should also be seen as 
having an important role. There should be acceptance of the possi-
bility that, in appropriate cases, the judiciary, especially because of 
their time-honored resistance to criteria of judgment other than 
those seeking objective bases and professional approbation, can 
give a lustre of fair play and justice to such calls for vindication. 
3. Common Law Developments 
While Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren has drawn 
the heaviest criticism, some discerning critics have also found 
Judge Edwards' opinion wanting. Thus, Professor Jordan Paust, at 
the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law, commented: 
Seemingly at the base of Judge Edwards' curious remarks 
about individual responsibility is an evident confusion with respect 
to the nature and function of international legal processes and the 
51. Verville, supra note 45 (testimony given before the Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary). 
52. Id. at 76. 
53. See Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the Inter-
national Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 26 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1 (1961). 
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role of domestic tribunals in identifying clarifying and applying in-
ternational law. This role has been demonstrated in federal opin-
ions since the 1700s. Judge Edwards seems to assume that merely 
because there had been lack of full and effective remedies for pri-
vate persons at the international level, nonstate actors could and 
can assert their rights only through diplomatic processes, that 
states alone were and are able to assert their rights only through 
diplomatic processes, that states alone were and are able to assert 
rights, and that only states or those acting "under color of state 
law" were or are liable. None of those assumptions is correct, how-
ever, and the trends in judicial decision provide sufficient 
refutation. 64 
Paust argued, instead, that litigation by private individuals in 
our domestic courts against the U.S. Government and against for-
eign governments, arising out of violations of international law has 
a long history and respectable provenance, including the decision 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in The Santissima Trinidad. H In April 
1817, the Spanish consul filed a libel in the District Court of Vir-
ginia against cargoes taken off of two Spanish ships, the Santis-
sima Trinidad and the St. Andes, by crewmen of two ships owned 
and commanded by American citizens. 156 At the time of the capture 
of the Santissima Trinidad and the St. Andes, the 1795 Treaty of 
Spain forbidding American citizens from taking commissions to 
cruise against Spain was still in force. 67 It also applied to prohibit 
the augmentation of the cruisers' armaments in American ports, 
which here also took place and thus provided a further cause of 
action.68 The district court decreed restitution to the cargo own-
ers. 69 This was affirmed first by the circuit court, and then by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.60 Justice Story observed that: 
But as to captures made during the same cruise, the doctrine 
of this Court has long established that such illegal augmentations 
[of the cruisers' armaments] is a violation of the law of nations, as 
54. Paust, Remarks, Panel on Jurisdiction' in Human Rights Cases: Is the Tel-Oren 
Case a Step Backward?, 79th ANN. MTG. A.S.I.L. PROC. 361, 364 (1985). 
55. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822); Paust, supra note 54, at 363; see also Reisman, 79th 
ANN. MTG. A.S.I.L. PROC. at 370-72. Reisman has stated, "I am grieved by the drastically 
reduced role for the judiciary in human rights cases that emerges from Tel-Oren and some 
other recent decisions . ... I believe that national courts may yet be used as fora· for en-
forcement of international human rights." Id. at 370-71. 
56. 20 U.S. at 284. 
57. Id. at 285. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 290. 
60. Id. at 355. 
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well as of our own municipal laws, and as a violation of our neu-
trality, by analogy to other cases, it infects the captures subse-
quently made with the character of torts, and justifies and requires 
a restitution to the parties who have been injured by such 
misconduct. 61 
Another scholar, Harold Honju Koh, has also written convincingly 
in support of an expanded role for domestic courts.62 He indicates 
the emergence of "transnational public law litigation." Professor 
Koh aptly points out that "Tel-Oren has forced both advocates 
and opponents of civil remedies against terrorism to reconsider 
what broader objectives civil remedies should serve and which in-
stitutions within the national government are best positioned to 
create and enforce those objectives. "63 Professor Koh further ar-
gues that "after Tel-Oren, Congress and not the courts must now 
play the role of Sancho Panza with respect to civil remedies 
against terrorism. "e. 
On the other hand, an alternative suggestion could be that the 
courts, envisaging the important policy goals to be realized, should 
develop a common law civil cause of action from the post Tel-Oren 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987.H In 
such an exercise, the courts would, necessarily, be faced with the 
task of selecting their rationale from the contrapuntal decisions 
following, on the one hand, J.I. Case v. Borak66 and Cort v. Ashe67 
on the other. In the former case, the plaintiff filed a stockholders' 
derivative suit against the J .I. Case Co. for, inter alia, damage and 
recission for a consummated merger which had been approved as a 
result of a proxy statement which the plaintiff claimed contained 
false and misleading statements. 68 While Congress, in enacting the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,69 "made no specific reference 
· to a private right of action under section (14)(a) ... ,"70 the Su-
61. Id. at 348-49. 
62. Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Trans-
national Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L L. J. 169 (1987). 
63. Id. at 208-09. 
64. Id. The reference to "Sancho Panza" arises from his quoted comment, 
"[r]ights ... preoccupy a Don Quixote; remedies are the work of a Sancho Panza." See id. at 
208. The phrase is taken from P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFI-
CIAL WRONGS 27 (1983). 
65. See supra notes 23-25 and the accompanying text. 
66. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
67. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
68. Borah, 377 U.S. at 429-30. 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
70. Borah, 377 U.S. at 431. 
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preme Court found, in an unanimous opinion, that "private parties 
have a right ... to bring suit for violation of Section 14(a) of the 
act."71 
Although, in the latter case, Cort,72 the Supreme Court, 
through Justice Brennan, refused to create a private cause of ac-
tion on behalf of the plaintiff, rather it set out criteria for the judi-
cial recognition of such statute-based private remedies.73 Justice 
Brennan stated: 
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a stat-
ute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, 
is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the stat-
ute was enacted' - that is, does the statute create a right in favor 
of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And 
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state 
law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would 
be inappropriate to inf er a cause of action based solely on federal 
law?7 " 
The above criteria have subsequently come under the fire of 
judicial critics. Thus Justice Powell dissenting in Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago1" stated "the Cort analysis too readily permits 
courts to override the decision of Congress not to create a private 
action .... "76 The refusal in Cort marked the emergence of a 
more cautious trend which has been reflected in later cases of the 
Supreme Court. 77 Arguably the Court would appear to be following 
a policy, if not one of retrenchment, at least one of lessened enthu-
siasm. But ambivalence appeared to hold the Court back from be-
coming committed entirely in one direction or the other - for 
finding the implication of causes of action when the statute failed 
explicity to create one or, alternatively, to rebuff without equivoca-
tion or hesitation, pleas to find the implication of causes of action 
where statutes do not expressly create them. 
While in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,78 the 
71. Id. at 430-31. 
72. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
73. Id. at 77-85. 
74. Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
75. 441 U.S. 677, 740-41 (1979). 
76. Id. at 740-41. (Powell, L., dissenting). 
77. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
78. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
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Supreme Court acted as if it had thrown out Justice Brennan's 
four tests created in Cort, criteria one, three and four of Brennan's 
formulation seem to have evaded rescission by that judgment. 
Naturam expellas /urea, tamen usque recurret.79 Be that as it 
may, the Congressional Record leading to the 1986 provisions of 
the Omnibus Act shows that even compliance with Cort and, fur-
ther, the later and more negative cases,80 would not rule out the 
possibility that the courts may rely on Congress' emphasis on the 
need to protect potential victims from terrorists. The fate of Leon 
Klinghoffer was so prominent in the debates that the courts might 
well feel impelled to decide in favor of creating a private cause of 
action in cases touching on the subject matter of the Omnibus Act 
III. CONCLUSION 
The quotation from Yeats at the outset of this offering reflects 
the incompleteness of the moral as well as the legal order of to-
day's world. The "passionate intensity" of the "worst" will not al-
ways be restricted to deeds of acceptable force while the "best lack 
all conviction." Rather, in such a world the chthonic fires of hu-
manity's pre-human past break out. There is no "civilization" ca-
pable of imposing the restraints of man's image of himself as a ra-
tional creature when values are rejected in order to indulge rage 
and hate. Moreover, such a mood reminds us of Oscar Wilde's 
comment on Victorian Romanticism's rejection of Realism: 
The nineteenth century dislike of realism is the rage of Cali-
ban seeing his own face in the glass. 11 
79. Translated as, "You can expel Nature with a pitchfork, yet it will always return." 
HORACE, EPISTLES I. X. 24. 
80. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curron, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). It is suggested that Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), may be 
viewed as standing on one side relative to the above cases since it recognizes a cause of 
action to enforce fourth amendment rights. On the other hand, it may be viewed as germane 
to the above discussion in a general sense. 
81. 0. WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY, Preface (1891). 
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